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Abstract
Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents
are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the
fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second
offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies.
The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The
optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number
of offenses. Indeed, the sanction for the first offense equals the entire wealth
while the sanction for the second offense is zero.
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1. Introduction
Most legal systems punish repeat offenders more severely for the same
offense than non-repeat offenders. Second-time offenders, for example, re-
ceive more severe punishment than first-time offenders. Penalty escalation
characterizes traditional crimes such as theft and murder, but also violations
of environmental and labor regulations, tax evasion, etc. This principle of
escalating sanctions based on offense history is so widely accepted that it is
embedded in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines.
For the rather well developed law and economics literature on optimal law
enforcement escalating sanction schemes are still a puzzle.1 This literature
looks for an efficiency-based rationale for such a practice. Does a sanction
scheme that minimizes enforcement costs indeed have the property of sanc-
tions increasing with offense history? So far the results have been mixed. At
the very best the literature, which we describe at the end of this introduc-
tion, has shown that under rather special circumstances escalating penalty
schemes may be optimal.
The purpose of this note is to add to this puzzle. We consider agents
who may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents
are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing
the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the possible sanction for
the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent
strategies, i.e., commit the crime a second time if and only if they were
(were not) apprehended the first time. The government seeks to minimize
the probability of apprehension.
Our basic result is that the optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather
than increasing in the number of offenses. Indeed, in our framework it is
optimal to set the sanction for the first offense equal to the entire wealth of the
agents while the sanction for the second offense equals zero. The key intuition
is as follows: A money penalty imposed for the second offense reduces the
amount a person can pay for the first offense, since the wealth available to
pay penalties is assumed to be fixed over the two periods. For that reason,
a higher probability event – namely, a first offense that is detected – will
be more effective use of the scarce money penalty resource than a lower
probability event – namely, a second detected offense.
Why is the probability of detection lower for the second rather than for
the first crime? An agent faces the possibility of being sanctioned for the
1See, e.g., Garoupa (1997) or Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for surveys of this literature.
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second crime if and only if she has already been sanctioned for the first time.
Moreover, suppose the first act went undetected and the agent commits the
second crime; then there is the possibility that she is apprehended for the
second crime for which she is charged, however, the first-time sanction since
she has no criminal record. Accordingly, whatever strategy the agent opts
for, she is more likely to pay the sanction for the first rather than for the
second crime. Shifting scarce wealth from the second to the first sanction,
therefore, increases deterrence.
Let us now discuss the related literature. In Rubinstein (1979) even
if an agent abides by the law, she may commit the act accidentally. The
government wishes to punish deliberate offenses but not accidental ones.
Rubinstein shows that in the infinitely repeated game an equilibrium exists
where the government does not punish agents with a “reasonable” criminal
record and the agents refrain from deliberate offenses.
Rubinstein (1980) considers a setup where an agent can commit two
crimes. A high penalty for the second crime is exogenously given. The
sanction for the first crime may be lower than the sanction for the second
crime. Rubinstein shows that for any set of parameters there exists a utility
function such that deterrence is higher if the sanction for the first crime is
lower than the sanction for the second crime. Rubinstein does not allow for
the second sanction to be lower than the first one.
Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) develop a dynamic model with repeat
offenses. Their concern is how prior offenses should affect the probability of
detection rather than the level of punishments.
In Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) agents receive an acceptable as well as
an illicit gain from the criminal activity. The government cannot observe the
illicit gains. Repeat offenses are, however, a signal of a high illicit gain. For
certain parameter values of the model it may be optimal to punish repeat
offenders more severely.
In Burnovski and Safra (1994) agents decide ex ante on the optimal
number of crimes. They show that if the probability of detection is suffi-
ciently small, reducing the sanction on subsequent crimes while increasing
the penalty on previous crimes decreases the overall criminal activity. This
paper is similar in spirit to ours. The main differences are: In their frame-
work agents cannot choose strategies that depend on history, in our setup
they can. Moreover, we derive the optimal policy that minimizes enforcement
costs.
In Polinsky and Shavell (1998) agents live for two periods and can commit
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a crime twice. The government observes the agent’s age and her criminal
record. They show that the following policy may be optimal: Young first-
time offenders and old second-time offenders are penalized with the maximum
sanction. Old first-time offenders may be treated leniently. Accordingly, this
result does not say that repeat offenders are punished more severely; old
first-time offenders may be punished less severely than old repeat- and young
first-time offenders.
Chu, Hu, and Huang (2000) consider like Rubinstein (1979) a legal sys-
tem that may also convict innocent offenders. The government takes the
possibility of erroneous conviction as a social cost into account. The opti-
mal penalty scheme punishes repeat offenders (slightly) more than first-time
offenders. Reducing the penalty for first-time and increasing it slightly for re-
peat offenders has no effect on deterrence. The cost of erroneous convictions
is, however, reduced because the probability of repeated erroneous conviction
is lower than for first-time mistakes.
Dana (2001) argues that contrary to the assumptions in the literature,
probabilities of detection increase for repeat offenders. As a result, the opti-
mal deterrence model dictates declining, rather than escalating, penalties for
repeat offenders. Taking the salience and optimism biases from behavioral
economics into account makes the case for declining penalties even stronger.
In the next section we describe the model and derive our basic result.
Section 3 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a set of individuals who live for two periods. In each period the
agents can engage in an illegal activity, such as false parking, polluting the
environment, or evading taxes. If an agent commits the act in either period,
she receives a monetary benefit b > 0. Yet the act causes a monetary harm
h > 0 to society. Let h > b so that the act is not socially desirable. The
individuals are to be deterred from the activity.2
To do so the government chooses sanctions. The government cannot tell
whether an agent is in the first or second period of her life. The government
only observes whether the crime is the first or the second one. Accordingly,
the government uses fines s1, s2 ≥ 0 where s1 applies to first-time and s2
2We assume that the benefits and the harms are the same for both crimes. If, say, the
benefit of the second crime were much higher than the benefit of the first one, this might
provide a rationale for escalating penalties.
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to second-time offenders. Moreover, the government chooses a probability
of apprehension p. This probability is the same for first- and second-time
offenses.3 Since apprehension is costly, the government wishes to minimize
p.
Individuals are risk neutral and maximize expected income. They have
initial wealth W > 0. Think of W as the value of the privately owned house
or assets with a long maturity. The agents hold on to their wealth over
both periods unless government interferes with sanctions. Any additional
income they receive in both periods, be it through legal or illegal activities,
is consumed immediately. Accordingly, all the government can confiscate
is W . If the fine exceeds the agent’s wealth, she goes bankrupt and the
government seizes the remaining assets. This implies that the fines s1 and s2
have to satisfy the “budget constraint” s1 + s2 = W .
4
To save on notation let the interest rate be zero. An agent can choose
between the following strategies:
• She can choose not to commit the act at all. We call this strategy (0,0)
which gives rise to utility U(0, 0) = W . This is the strategy we wish to
implement.
• She can choose to commit the act in period 1 and not in period 2.
Call this strategy (1,0); here we have U(1, 0) = W + b − ps1. The act
generates benefit b; with probability p the agent is apprehended and
pays the sanction s1.
• The agent can opt to commit the crime in period 2 but not in period
1. Call this strategy (0,1) generating utility U(0, 1) = W + b − ps1.
With strategy (0,1) the agent has the same utility as with strategy (1,0)
because the government observes only one offense.
• Moreover, the agent can commit the act in both periods which we
denote by (1, 1) and U(1, 1) = W + b − ps1 + b − p((1 − p)s1 + ps2)).
3We thus rule out the case where agents with a criminal record are more closely moni-
tored than agents without a record. See Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) for an analysis
of optimal detection probabilities.
4This assumption distinguishes our approach from Polinsky and Shavell (1998) who
work with a maximum per period sanction sm. Accordingly, they may set s1 = s2 = sm,
which is typically the optimal enforcement scheme. In their framework sm is like a per
period income which cannot be transferred into the next period. Burnovski and Safra
(1994) use the same budget constraint as we do.
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The second crime is detected with probability p. With probability p the
agent has a criminal record in the second period and thus is fined s2;
with probability (1− p) she has no record and pays s1 if apprehended.
• Finally, the agent can choose two history dependent strategies.5 First,
she commits the act in period 1. If she is not apprehended, she also
commits the act in period 2; however, if she is apprehended in period
1, she does not commit the act in period 2. Call this strategy (1,(1|no
record;0|otherwise)) with U(1, (1|no record; 0|otherwise)) = W + b −
ps1 + (1 − p)(b − ps1). Since the agent stops her criminal activities if
she is apprehended once, she is never sanctioned with s2.
• Second, she commits the act in period 1. If she is not apprehended, she
does not commit the act in period 2; however, if she is apprehended in
period 1, she commits the act in period 2. Call this strategy (1,(0|no
record;1|otherwise)) with U(1, (0|no record; 1|otherwise)) = W + b −
ps1 + p(b − ps2). It turns out that this strategy defines the binding
incentive constraint for the optimal sanctions.
Let us now derive sanctions that give the agents proper incentives not to
engage in the activity in either period. We assume that agents have enough
wealth so that deterrence is always possible, i.e., 2b < W . The agent does not
follow strategy (1,0), if U(1, 0) ≤ U(0, 0), she does not follow strategy (0,1), if
U(0, 1) ≤ U(0, 0), etc. Straightforward computations confirm that the agent
does not engage in strategies (1,0), (0,1), and (1,(1|no record;0|otherwise)),
if
s1 ≥ b/p; (1)
she does not pick strategy (1, 1), if
s2 ≥ (2b/p2)− s1((2/p)− 1); (2)
and she does not pick strategy (1,(0|no record;1|otherwise)), if
s2 ≥ (b(1 + p)/p2)− s1/p. (3)
insert Figure 1 around here
5These history dependent strategies distinguish our paper from Burnovski and Safra
(1994) where individuals decide ex ante simply on the number of crimes.
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Accordingly, with all sanction schemes (s1, s2) to the right of the bold
line in Figure 1, the agent has proper incentives and commits no crime. For
example, the scheme sˆ1 = sˆ2 = b/p induces no crimes. Note that we can lower
sˆ2 by 1 while increasing sˆ1 by 1 and stay within the set of incentive compatible
schemes, because 1/p ≥ 1. This is a generalized version of the Burnovski and
Safra (1994) result, because we also allow for history dependent strategies
which they don’t.
Let us next tackle the task of minimizing the enforcement costs, as given
by p, while providing incentives not to commit any crime. We will minimize
p taking the incentive constraint (3) into account. Then we show that the
optimal p∗ also satisfies the incentive constraints (1) and (2).
Obviously, Becker’s (1968) maximum fine result applies here, meaning
that in order to minimize p the government will use the agent’s entire wealth
for sanctions.6 Accordingly, plugging the budget constraint s1+s2 = W into
(3) and differentiating the equality yields dp/ds1 = (p−p2)/(b−s1−2p(W −
s1)) < 0 for b < s1 ≤ W . Consequently, s∗1 = W, s∗2 = 0, and p∗ = b/(W −b).
Since b/p < 2b/p(1 − p) < b(1 + p)/p ∀p ∈ (0, 1), the incentive constraints
(1) and (2) are also satisfied.
We thus find that the optimal sanction scheme sets s∗1 = W and s
∗
2 = 0.
First time offenders are punished with the maximal possible sanction while
second time offenders are not punished at all. The sanction s1 is high enough
that it not only deters first-time offenses but also second-time offenses even
though they come for free.
The intuition for this result follows immediately from the incentive con-
straint (3). The agent pays the sanction s1 with probability p and the sanc-
tion s2 only with probability p
2. To put it differently: The agent is charged
s2 with probability p if and only if she has paid already s1. Since paying the
fine s1 is more likely than paying s2, shifting resources from s2 to s1 increases
deterrence for given p. Consequently, p is minimized by putting all the scarce
resources into s1.
It is perhaps somewhat surprising that the strategy (1,(0|no record;1|other-
wise)) and not the strategy (1,(1|no record;0|otherwise)) defines the binding
incentive constraint in the optimal penalty structure. Given that the opti-
mal penalties are declining, an agent who was not apprehended for the first
crime has a strong incentive not to commit the act a second time: if she is
apprehended she pays the high sanction s1. If the agent was, however, ap-
6If s1+s2 < W , sanctions can be raised and p lowered so as to keep deterrence constant.
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prehended for the first crime, the second crime comes for free. The sanction
s1 has to be high enough so that she doesn’t commit the first crime in the
first place.
3. Conclusions
The purpose of this note is to help understand the difficulties the law and
economics literature has in explaining escalating penalties. If a higher sanc-
tion for the second crime means a lower sanction for the first crime and vice
versa, cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing, rather than increasing, in the
number of offenses.7 Since an agent can only be a repeat offender if she has
been a first-time offender, there is no second offense if we completely deter
the first one. This effect seems to be quite robust and should also apply to
non-monetary sanctions. Accordingly, if one wants to give a rationale for
the widely prevailing escalating penalties, one has to go beyond the simple
deterrence model a` la Becker.8 The rationale for escalating sanctions has to
be stronger than the effect identified in this note.
We have looked at the case where the government wants complete deter-
rence. If we take a framework with non-identical agents where some under-
deterrence is efficient, with our sanction scheme those who are under-deterred
will always be repeat offenders because the second crime is free. Yet our re-
sult still holds if some individuals should commit the crime twice because
their benefits are high and the rest should commit no crime at all because
their benefits are low. If we wish, however, to implement more complicated
crime structures, the optimal sanction scheme may be different from ours.
7Similar results hold in repeated moral hazard situations. For example, if agents decide
strategically over time on how carefully to treat a consumer durable, optimal incentive
compatible warranties tend to increase, rather than decrease, with the product’s age. See
Emons (1989).
8Perhaps one has to call upon the notions of fairness, moral, and justice to explain
increasing sanctions.
7
References
Becker, G.: Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal
of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217.
Burnovski, M. and Z. Safra: Deterrence Effects of Sequential Pun-
ishment Policies: Should Repeat Offenders be more Severely Punished, In-
ternational Review of Law and Economics, 14 (1994), 341-350.
Chu, C. Y. Cyrus, Sheng-cheng Hu, and Ting-yuan Huang:
Punishing Repeat Offenders more Severely, International Review of Law and
Economics, 20 (2000), 127-140.
Dana, D. A.: Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat
Offenders,Yale Law Journal, 110 (2001), 733-783.
Emons, W.: On the Limitation of Warranty Duration, Journal of In-
dustrial Economics, 37 (1989), 287-302.
Garoupa, N.: The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, Journal of
Economic Surveys, 11 (1997), 267-295.
Landsberger, M. and I. Meilijson: Incentive Generating State De-
pendent Penalty System, The Case of Income Tax Evasion, Journal of Public
Economics 19 (1982), 333-352.
Polinsky, M. and S. Shavell: The Economic Theory of Public En-
forcement of Law, Journal of Economic Literature, 38 (2000), 45-76.
Polinsky, M. and S. Shavell: On Offense History and the Theory of
Deterrence, International Review of Law and Economics, 18 (1998), 305-324.
Polinsky, M. and D. Rubinfeld: A Model of Fines for Repeat Of-
fenders, Journal of Public Economics 46 (1991), 291-306.
Rubinstein, A.: An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May
Have Been Committed by Accident, in: Applied Game Theory, S. Brams,
A. Schotter, and G. Schwo¨diauer (Eds.) Wu¨rzburg, Physica-Verlag, 1979,
406-413.
Rubinstein, A.: On an Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment,
Economics Letters, 6 (1980), 89-94.
8
Fi
gu
re
 1
: T
he
 S
et
 o
f I
nc
en
tiv
e 
Co
m
pa
tib
le
 S
an
ct
io
ns
 
an
d 
th
e
O
pt
im
al
 S
an
ct
io
n 
Sc
he
m
e (
W
,0
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
*
)
1( p
p
b
W
+
=
)1
*
)
/
2((
)
*
/
2(
1
2
2
−
−
=
p
s
p
b
s
2
s
1s
*
pb
W
*
/
*
/
*
)
1(
1
2
2
p
s
p
p
b
s
−
+
=
*
)
2(
*
2
p
 
p
b −
*
pb
